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1. Introduction

In 2011 India joined the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a nonpermanent member for the first time in 19 years. With high hopes India's permanent representative to the United Nations (UN), Hardeep Puri, announced that "before we complete our two-year term, we will be a permanent member" (Bagchi 2010). Whilst on the Council Puri further stated that India would serve:

> in a manner which provides a clear message to all that India is a country which not only has the credentials but the political maturity to supervise the work of the Council and…that we have the credentials to be a permanent member (Parashar 2011).

Yet by the end of 2012 India had left the UNSC having failed to achieve these lofty aims. Many commentators bemoaned the quiet exit as a "wasted opportunity" for the rising great power (Srinivasan 2013), but to what extent were these commentators correct?

This study seeks to assess to what extent India used its two-year stint on the Council to progress its status as a great power, and therefore further its attempt to gain a permanent seat on the UNSC. India's status-seeking will be assessed using a constructivist-lens, rather than a materialistic neo-realist approach. The constructivist-lens focuses on the importance of recognition in international society, rather than merely relying on material capability as a measure. Using this lens the study will analyse India's attempts to be seen as a responsible power, willing to uphold the present international order. Status is sought through two key methods: norm-setting and burden sharing. Burden sharing is the provision of material and immaterial goods

towards a provision of public goods. Norm setting is the creation of practises and rules by which international behaviour is governed.

This study is the first of its kind to use a constructivist-lens to assess India's status seeking behaviour during the 2011-12 nonpermanent membership of the UNSC. At present there have only been a small number of assessments of the 2011-12 stint (R. Mukherjee and Malone 2013, Srinivasan 2013), which have provided only overviews of India's time on the Council, with a focus on the events of Libya and Syria, judging India's actions based on short-term outcomes. This study therefore fills a gap in the literature by providing an in-depth analysis of the different areas India sought to be active in, as well as investigating the actions taken in regard to the crises in Libya and Syria.

This case study has been chosen for two reasons. Firstly, India has officially pursued a permanent seat on the UNSC since 1994 and therefore the actions taken whilst in this Council will best reflect their attempts at status seeking (Mathur 2005: 2). Secondly, the UNSC is the chief example of multilateralism through which to measure an aspirant global great power's status seeking behaviour. Within this stint two distinct categories will be explored that give the greatest insight into status seeking behaviour and a state's attempts to be viewed as responsible in upholding global order. Firstly, the study will assess India's actions in three areas that represent external threats to global order: terrorism, piracy and peacekeeping. Secondly, the study will assess India's reaction to international crises during the 2011-12 period, focusing on the crises in Libya and Syria. These two crises have been chosen as they provide an insight into the role of intervention and the threat it poses to international order.

Having undertaken this assessment it is clear that unlike commentators initial judgements (R. Mukherjee and Malone 2013, Srinivasan 2013), India did successfully pursue great power status in a number of areas through the creation of norms and burden sharing. India's reaction to crisis has been regarded as irresponsible but, instead reflected India's longstanding policy of non-intervention, a norm it has consistently attempted to implement. Furthermore it reflected India's appeals to multiple audiences in seeking recognition, not solely from the US and western powers. However, India's reaction to the crisis in Syria did show indecision, which weakened India's great power claims. Rather than gaining an immediate permanent seat, as had been hoped, India shrewdly increased its status even if only marginally, with an eye to the future.

Section Two provides a historical background to India's membership in 2011-12. It will then review and critique the neo-realist approach to understanding status in the international system; positing instead the strengths of the constructivist-lens. This lens thus provides the theoretical framework for the study. Section Three analyses India's actions in three key areas: counter-terrorism, anti-piracy and peacekeeping; showing how active India was in both burden sharing and norm setting during 2011-12. Section Four analyses India's reaction to the two major crises in Libya and Syria, critiquing commentators view of India as irresponsible, instead showing that India pursued its self-interest and tacitly attempted to set new norms against intervention. Section Five offers conclusions to the study as well as potential limitations and areas of future study.

2. Background, Literature Review, Theoretical Framework and Methodology

2.1 India's History with the UNSC

India was a founding member of the UN in 1945 (Thakur 2011, 899). By historical quirk India was still under the colonial rule and was therefore not granted permanent membership of the UNSC. Instead permanent member status, and the power of the veto, was given to the five 'victors' of the Second World War: USSR, USA, UK, France and China. The UNSC was formed as the pinnacle of the UN body, with the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (UN Charter Article 24.1).

India's relationship with the UNSC has been historically tumultuous. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, was a leading advocate of the UN and its potential for bringing peace. However, following India's first interaction with the UNSC, Nehru was left jaded over their decision not to condemn Pakistan's illegally backed invasion of Kashmir. This initial snub jaded Indian elite's views of the body, deeming it to merely operate for the benefit of the Permanent Five (P5) members. Even with this rough start it has been suggested that in 1955 Nehru turned down the offer of China's permanent seat (Wax and Lakshmi 2010), a claim Nehru categorically denied arguing that "there has been no offer" (*The Hindu* 1955).

It is worth noting that India's current pursuit of status is not a new phenomenon. India has long pursued status in different forms. During the Cold War, under Nehru's guidance, India sought the status of being a moral power (Abraham 2007: 4209). The founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to counter Cold War bipolarity and a commitment to nuclear disarmament marked India's foreign policy following independence (Malone 2011). The humiliating loss to China in the border war of 1962 fundamentally changed this, with India looking to its material capabilities (idem). 2011-12 marked the return of India to the Council for the seventh time[1], but the first time in nearly two decades[2]. In its absence India's material world-standing had fundamentally altered.

2.1.1 Reform Attempts

There are a number reasons why India covets a permanent seat. Firstly, a permanent seat with a veto would give India control over any actions the Council attempted to take (Narlikar 2011: 1610). This is important to India, especially with regards to Kashmir and their ongoing tensions with Pakistan (Cohen 2001: 34). Secondly, a permanent seat would reflect that India had been accepted as a great power, and worthy of a role in international governance at the apex of the multilateral world (idem, Malone 2000: 6). Both of these reasons explain India's attempt to seek status in the international system.

[1] India has also served as a non-permanent member the following years: 1950-1, 1967-8, 1972-3, 1977-8, 1984-5 and 1991-2.
[2] India had attempted to be elected to the Council as a nonpermanent member in 1996, but lost to Japan, gaining only 40 votes in comparison to Japans 142 votes.

In 2005 India, as part of G4 with Japan, Germany and Brazil, proposed a Resolution to the UN General Assembly (UNGA), attempting to get permanent seats for them all. This Resolution failed to gain support, as the majority of states deemed the move to be a purely "self-serving" attempt at gaining power (Cooper and Fues 2008: 299). However, India's future membership has received endorsements from Russia, UK, France and USA, but has been resisted by China (*The Economic Times* 2010). In released *Wikileaks* cables China is reported to have told the USA not to be proactive in reforming the UNSC, as the P5's power would be "diluted" (Pubby 2010).

Since the failure of G4's initial proposal the grouping has altered its message in an attempt to gain more support. This has taken the form of proposing the increase of permanent membership to 11 with extra seats in Africa, Latin America and Asia (PMUN 2011d). They have also proposed increasing the number of nonpermanent members from 10 to 15, giving greater representation for smaller nations (idem). Agreement on reforming the Council has stalled following 9 years of Intergovernmental Negotiations.

India's policy change is a reflection of the different audiences India has to appeal to, in all of its actions when pursuing status. With regards to gaining a seat on the UNSC India must appeal to both the UNGA and the P5. To change the UN Charter, and gain a permanent seat, India requires backing from two-thirds of the UNGA and acquiescence or support from all of the P5 (Schaffer 2009). This dichotomy of audiences is important when understanding India's status seeking actions, as will be discussed in the next section.

2.2 Power and Great Power Status

Power is a contested aspect of international relations scholarship, which divides the main schools of thought. The most basic definition of power is best captured by Dahl: "**A** has power over **B,** to the extent that he can get **B** to do something that **B** would not otherwise do" (Dahl 1957: 202-3). This definition holds for each of the major approaches to international relations, but differences remain over how power is exerted and how powers are to be ranked. The major fault-line on this subject is between the neo-realist materialist approach and constructivist societal approach.

The neo-realist school pits the world of international relations as one of anarchy, due to the lack of a world government. From this concept power is purely materialistic, usually in the form of economic or military capability. A great power in realist scholarship is a state that is strong relative to other states, based on their material capabilities. Great power status is therefore a positional good, and states are ranked in a hierarchy based on their capabilities (Larson & Shevchenko 2010: 5).

Waltz (1979: 131), argues that power is measured and ranked based on a number of categories including: "size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence". However Waltz continues to argue that to be a great power a state cannot merely dominate in one of these categories, but instead their "rank depends on how they score on all" (idem). Hagerty (2009: 35) argues that states that score highly in some categories, but not all, are "lopsided" powers, and cannot be deemed as great powers.

From this perspective there remains to be a clear way in which these rankings are formalised, as often these measures of capability are difficult to compare. Waltz states that historically: “one finds general agreement about who the great powers of a period are, with occasional doubt in marginal cases” (Waltz 1979: 131). Status in neo-realist thinking therefore lacks a distinct way of measuring exactly who is a great power and who is not, except through major global conflict.

2.3 Recognition and the Constructivist-Lens

The constructivist-lens seeks to answers this problem through the paradigm of recognition. Bull (1977: 200-2) argues that as well as having material power a state must be “recognised by others to have…certain special rights and duties” in the international system. A state’s status as a great power is therefore entirely dependent on recognition, rather than mere material claims to status. Without recognition a state cannot assume the special rights and duties of a great power state. First among these rights is the ability to determine the “issues that affect peace and security of the international system” (idem). States that have the capability, but lack recognition, fall into Suzuki’s (2008: 46) category of being “frustrated great powers”. Wight (1979: 45-6) goes further arguing that declining states and potential future rising states are often given great power status through recognition, rather than actual capability. This can be seen by the creation of the P5 in 1945, which consisted of both declining powers (Britain and France) and potential powers (China) as well as the two superpowers (Buzan 2004: 62).

In the past states have sought to create new international systems as they have risen to be pre-eminent powers. In the modern age great power aspirants have sought instead

to become status-quo powers, rather than challenge the system. This is partly the result of war no longer being a method through which to create a new system, as a result of nuclear weapons (Nayar and Paul 2003: 34). Aspirant great power states, such as China and India seek recognition as social equals from the other great powers, but also to be welcomed to participate in institutionalised "decision making processes pertaining to the governance of international society" (Suzuki 2008: 48). In the case of India this means a permanent seat in the UNSC, with the veto.

Aspiring states seek recognition by attempting to show they are responsible international stakeholders and actively willing to uphold the current international order (Dormandy 2007: 61). Suzuki (2008: 46) argues that even frustrated great powers actively seek status by playing "recognition games", with the aim of showing their peers they are worthy. Rather than challenging the current world order these recognition games "strengthen the normative structures of international society" (idem). The aim of these games is to show that an aspirant state is responsible and able to assume greater position in the international system, as "with great power, comes great responsibility" (Narlikar 2011: 1601).

What type of international system then is currently in place that 'responsible' states uphold? This is a hotly debated topic within the constructivist approach to international relations. Overall the system is seen as a society of states, each recognising each other's individual sovereignty (Bull 1977, Wight 1977: 135). Differences in the constructivist approach rest on the notions of justice and rights, and how these concepts relate to intervention in states. This division is best captured by Wheeler (1992: 468) in his discussion of the 'pluralist' and 'solidarist' perspectives:

> where pluralists are fearful of the consequences for order of legitimising an individual right of humanitarian intervention in a society of states with diverse conceptions of justice, [solidarists] assert that there is a duty of collective humanitarian intervention in cases of extreme human suffering.

Using these definitions it is apparent that India takes a pluralist view, opposing humanitarian intervention in sovereign states. The current international system is also presently constructed along these lines, with order stemming from states recognition of each other's sovereignty (Wight 1977: 135). However, there is a growing trend among some states that support the solidarist perspective in favour of humanitarian intervention (Brown 1992: 125), often to mask their own agenda.

Overall the international system is pluralist, with only a handful of states in favour of direct intervention. This distinction is key to understanding the debates surrounding intervention during the crises discussed within this study. As the present system is pluralist, with order stemming from non-intervention and respect of national sovereignty, for a state to be seen as responsible it must uphold and maintain this order. Some states reject this reading of the international society, instead favouring humanitarian intervention (when undertaken by them). This debate comes to the fore in Section Four, which assesses India's actions over the crises in Libya and Syria.

This raises the question of which audience India aims its 'recognition games' at? If we assume the audience to be the great powers of the P5, then views on intervention are divided. However, if the audience for India's status seeking behaviour, and aims of recognition, instead is the wider audience, represented by the 193 members of the UNGA, then taking a non-interventionist view makes more sense, as smaller states oppose threats to their sovereignty. This study will look at both audiences, with a

focus on the wider audience. This wider audience is key to India's hopes of a future permanent seat on the UNSC, due to the need of a two-thirds majority in the UNGA to amend the UN Charter.

2.3.1 Provision of Public Goods

How then do states attempt to show they are responsible powers and seek recognition? Narlikar (2011: 1608) argues that one of the main ways in which a state seeks to show they are responsible is through "the ability and willingness to provide global public goods". Such public goods are not free for the aspirant power and through their provision a state shows its "willingness to incur these costs" (idem). In the international realm public goods are goods that all can benefit from. This can include: a clean environment, eradication of disease, freedom of the seas and peace (Kaul 2000). For a good to be deemed public all states must be able to benefit from it. This is not to say that the good provided may not directly benefit the state which provides it. Often such goods further the normative and material interests of the state in question.

Dormandy (2007: 62), argues that there are two key methods through which a state like India can show it is responsible by providing public goods: burden sharing and norm setting. These two methods of status seeking often overlap.

2.3.2 Burden Sharing

Burden sharing in the international system involves providing resources, both material and immaterial, to uphold and contribute to the maintenance of the international order

(idem). One of the most obvious forms of burden sharing is through financial funding of institutions or international efforts (idem). As well as providing financial support a state can also burden share by providing particular services. With regards to the UN this has often come in the form of providing peacekeepers to UN missions, and increasingly providing training (Findlay 1996: 5). A final way a state can burden share is through the provision of leadership in certain areas, giving support to international efforts. This study will measure India's attempts at burden sharing through each of these methods in a number of different areas.

2.3.3 Norm Setting

The second method of providing international public goods is through the setting of norms (Dormandy 2007: 61-2, Larson & Shevchenko 2010: 17). Norms are a form of international governance that "give rise to expectations as to what will in fact be done in a particular situations" and "give rise to normative expectations as to what ought to be done" (Hurrell 2011: 143). Norms thusly shape behaviour of states and non-state actors. Nations that set norms often do so to uphold and shape the international system. This means that norms often favour the state creating them, such as financial regulation or free-trade (Büthe &Mattli 2011).

The setting of norms helps to preserve international order as states can accurately predict how others will act. Following these norms therefore reflects the behaviour of a responsible state (Suzuki 2008, Larson & Shevchenko 2010: 9). To set norms a state requires support from fellow states for the norm to become accepted (ibid 17). In this regard a norm is more likely to be successfully set if it is in areas where there is general agreement between states. As norms may not always be codified it is harder to

measure a state's attempt to set them. This study will therefore to assess India's attempts to be seen as a responsible power through the setting of norms.

2.4 Indian Great Power

Following this general discussion of power in the international system it is necessary to ask: what type of power is India? This is a contested question, with numerous authors offering their own adjective or verb to explain India's current power standing. Cohen (2001: 1-4) introduces the idea of India as an "emerging" great power. Rather than yet being a great power, India is in the process of becoming one. Other authors echo this sentiment describing India as a "rising" power (Nayar and Paul 2003) and an "aspiring" power (Khilnani 2005, Cooper & Fues 2008).

Predictions for when great power will be achieved also differ. Hagerty (2009: 24) predicted that India "will almost certainly qualify as a military and economic great power by 2020". A report by the National Intelligence Council (NIC 2004: 47) equally predicted India, following China, would be come a "major global power" by 2020. However, not all scholars and commentators agree, instead seeing India as struggling to enter the realm of great powers due to internal political constraints (Narlikar 2011: 13, Khilnani 2005 9).

Not all view India as becoming a "great" power but rather being a different type of power. Khilnani (idem) argues that India should be a "bridging power" between the developed and developing world. Alternatively, some have regarded India as being solely a regional or middle power in the international system (Nel 2010: 951, Perkovich 2004: 3).

2.4.1 Hard Power Capabilities

The claims of India's growing power status have largely been restricted to material power capabilities. India has gained the world's attention as a rising power for a number of reasons. Most importantly has been its growing economic power and standing in the world (Cohen 2001: 35, Ollapally 2013: 213). Since the 1980s India's economy has grown rapidly. Although beset by issues of human development, India is rapidly becoming an economic giant (Nayar and Paul 2003: 44).

Indian power was also brought to the world's attention by the testing of nuclear weapons in 1998. These tests confirmed to the world that India had nuclear weapons capacity (Narlikar 2011: 1612, Bava 2007: 4). Although these tests saw India receive economic sanctions and be deemed as a pariah state, these measures have slowly been drawn back, with states instead engaging with the nuclear power (Nayar and Paul 2003: 8).

Both of these measures have been cited by numerous scholars as prime example for India as a rising power and why it is set to become a major world power. Other measures by which India has gained this new title include their growing military capacity (Dormandy 2007: 68); the second largest population in the world, with nearly a sixth of the world's population; and India's long standing title of being the world's largest democracy. These measures have collectively led India to be ranked alongside the P5 and other aspirant powers such as Germany and Japan.

2.4.2 Claims of Entitlement

These material claims have led Indian political elites to seek recognition as a great power based on claims of entitlement (R. Mukherjee and Malone 2013: 110). These stem from India's comparative advantages over the permanent members of the UNSC, in certain regards. Based on population size India is home to one-sixth of the world's population, only China is larger. It is on a par with each of the powers by being a nuclear weapons state. India's GDP (adjusted for Purchasing power parity (PPP)) is larger than Russia, France and the UK (*World Bank*). Its governmental system is democratic in comparison to China's one party communism and Russia's pseudo-authoritarianism. It is therefore in many regards unclear why India is not a permanent member of the UNSC. It is on this basis that Indians claim they are entitled to a seat as they are a rising material power (P. Mukherjee 2005) but also entitled due to the current lack of representation for one-sixth of the world's population (Nel 2010). However, there are numerous materialistic measures by which India is not on a par with the P5.

2.5 Methodology

To undertake this assessment of India's status seeking behaviour this paper uses five case studies outlined above: counter-terrorism, anti-piracy, peacekeeping, the Libyan crisis and the Syrian crisis. These cases have been chosen as they each represent different types of threat to the international order. Therefore it is possible to assess a state's actions in each of these areas, to see if they sought to uphold international order. For each of these areas key speeches, debates and explanations of votes produced by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Indian Permanent

Mission to the UN (PMUN) in New York will be used to assess whether India pursued norm setting and burden sharing. As well as these primary sources of evidence the study also analyses interviews and news articles from the time around the 2011-12 stint. These secondary sources of information are particularly useful as some of the UNSC sessions were held behind closed doors, for which there is no official recorded information.

3. External Threats to International Order

India joined the Council having won an election by member states, receiving 187 votes out of 192 (Roy 2010). On entering the Council India sought to take the lead in a number of fields including: counter-terrorism, anti-piracy and peacekeeping. These areas are of particular normative importance as they each represent a different threat to the preservation of the current international order. India set out to show that it was a capable and responsible power, and that it could take the lead in upholding international security (*The Times of India (TOI)* 2011). Whereas, these issues had been of great importance in the past, they were not to grab the headlines due to a series of political uprisings began across North Africa and the Middle East. Although these political uprisings were not the primary focus of the UNSC, they became the benchmark by which all members were to be judged.

3.1 Counter-Terrorism

India took an active role on the issue of counter-terrorism during its membership of the UNSC. This issue is of particular interest to India which has been a victim of terrorism, alongside each of the major powers and many of the minor powers (PMUN 2011g). Indian representative to the UN, Puri, stated that “in our globalized world, terrorists are also globalized in their reach and activities and are able to wage an asymmetric warfare against the international community” (PMUN 2012b). Counter-terrorism therefore falls into the remit of the UNSC’s mandate to uphold international peace. Terrorism in the world order is nearly universally accepted as negative, for states and international society. Therefore India’s provision of goods in this field had the potential to be widely accepted.

India's active role in this area began immediately with Puri being elected as Chairman of the Counter-Terror Committee (CTC) for the entirety of India's two-year stint (*TOI* 2011). Puri's actions as Chairman of the CTC reflect an attempt to set new norms and invigorate the work of the committee.

3.1.1 Burden Sharing

India's burden sharing role in this area reflects a diverse picture of status seeking. Materially the Indian government promised resources for specific areas, particularly in Afghanistan. This material support came in the form of aid for development, with the aim of countering terrorist group's capabilities. India pledged $1.3bn for development assistance in 2011(PMUN 2011e), a figure that had risen to $2bn by 2012 (PMUN 2012a). As well as economic assistance, India also offered technical help with "capacity-building", "education" and building "civil society" (idem). They also further sought to integrate the country into the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (PMUN 2011e).

India's focus primarily on Afghanistan reflects India's limited scope of power projection outside of its immediate region. It is therefore debateable to what extent this is a public good or solely an Indian interest. Overall it can be regarded as a public good, as the prevention of terrorist groups regaining a foothold in Afghanistan poses a global threat to peace and security (idem). It can also be seen to be within India's national interest as they hope to build strong bilateral ties with Afghanistan. This burden sharing is also relatively low when compared to other countries. The USA for example gave Afghanistan $2.7 trillion in bilateral aid between 2009 and 2013 (*World*

Bank). India's material commitment to burden sharing was therefore limited in scope, but showed commitment to India's status seeking and national interest.

In a non-material sense India has provided burden sharing through its leadership of the CTC. Under India's Chairmanship there was a large increase in activity within the CTC. This included a greater number of meetings, reports and policy suggestions. This was in part due to it being the ten year anniversary of 9/11, but also reflected India's leadership in this important field (UNSC CTC 2011). This extra activity saw India chairing and hosting a number of special meetings, in New York on "preventing and Suppressing Terrorist Financing" in November 2012 and "a regional workshop for Police Officers, Prosecutors and Judges in South Asia" held in New Delhi in March 2012 (PMUN(c)). The pinnacle of India's Chairmanship resulted in the recommendation to the UNGA and UNSC of an approach of "zero-tolerance towards terrorism" (MEA 2011b). Leadership of the CTC reflected India's nonmaterial burden sharing in the realm of counter-terrorism, with the aim of upholding international order.

3.1.2 Norm Setting

India's pursuit of norm setting in this field was extensive. The production of the "zero tolerance" policy was the high watermark in this attempt to set norms. The policy was put forward by Puri in his role as chair of the CTC (PMUN 2011m), and supported on behalf of India (PMUN 2011n). Prior to the announcement Puri stated that the policy:

> will usher in a new qualitative and substantive improvement in the normative framework and we will adopt an ambitious outcome document that, will

> introduce a new 'zero tolerance' paradigm in the international community's fight against terrorism. (*The Hindustan Times* 2011b)

This reflects India's direct pursuit of norm setting at the UNSC.

The 'zero tolerance' policy recommended that "where States have the institutions and capacities, they must clamp down on terrorism" (MEA 20/11/11). This included clamping down on safe havens and funding networks to terrorist groups.

In setting new norms India wanted to avoid setting any precedent that involve direct intervention by states in other states (Schaffer 2009: 188). India argued that states can "assist in building capacities to counter-terrorism" in states that lacked the capacity to do so, rather than directly intervene to implement them (MEA 20/11/11). This is a reflection of India's own ongoing insurgencies, particularly in Kashmir.

India was also active in attempting to get terrorist groups universally listed and recognised by all member states. This included welcoming the recognition of the Haqqini Network as a terrorist organisation (V. Mohan 2012) and eventual support for the separate sanctions regime for the Taliban and Al Qaeda (Samanta 2011).

3.1.3 India Responsible?

In the realm of counter-terrorism India was therefore very active in seeking to be seen as a responsible power, and therefore a great power. In particular, India's norm setting behaviour reflected a global approach to, and leadership in, the issue. India was further able to project its specific views of non-intervention in sovereign states as part of this approach. India's burden sharing met both its national interest and the interest

of the international community. India's burden sharing was limited to its immediate regional neighbourhood in Afghanistan. India's ability to set norms in this area was therefore more extensive than its ability to share international burdens.

3.2 Anti-Piracy

The next major area that India focused its attention on was in anti-piracy. The maintenance of the freedom of the sea is important to upholding the current international order, which is increasingly based on free-trade (PMUN(b)). India is directly affected by piracy in the Indian Ocean originating from Somalia. Six-percent of the world's seafarers were Indian in 2011 and 24 Indian-flagged vessels transited through the Gulf of Aden every month, so the threat of piracy is very important to India (PMUN 2011b).

3.2.1 Burden Sharing

In material burden sharing, India contributed 24 ships as part of international efforts to curb piracy in the India Ocean. These ships have escorted 1487 ships in the area, "including 1321 foreign flagged vessels from different countries" (PMUN(b)), with no ship under Indian escort has been hijacked by pirates (PMUN 2011b). This is a direct form of burden sharing as it provides security to shipping.

India was also active in founding an international "Contact Group" which has been cited as one of the key reasons for the reduction of pirate hijackings in the area in recent years (PMUN(b)). Furthermore, with regards to Somalia, India provided direct financial aid and training to help restore stability. This included contributing $2bn to

the UN Missions in Somalia to help improve law and order capacity (PMUN 2012c). Finally, India provided leadership over the issue of piracy, co-sponsoring Resolution 1976 which was the first of its kind to deal with piracy. It was reported in the Indian Express that: “members of the Security Council widely appreciated India's contribution in the drafting and adoption of the resolution” (*Indian Express* 2011a). This was reflective of India’s non-material leadership burden sharing, that went hand-in-hand with India’s attempts to set norms in this area.

3.2.2 Norm setting

India actively sought to reform the international approach to anti-piracy. Throughout their two year period they advocated a new three-pronged approach to international efforts. First of these prongs was to create a “UN-led anti-piracy force to conduct naval operations” (PMUN 2011j). India favoured this approach as it would lead to “greater coordination...by various naval forces” (idem). The second prong was for all member states to enact “national laws…to criminalize piracy as defined in the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea”, ensuring that all members follow the same law with regards to this issue (idem). Finally, India proposed that there was a need for “effective sanitazation of the Somali coastline along with identifying safe corridors and buffer zones” (idem). This would help root out piracy and provide Somali fishermen safe access to the sea as an alternative form of income to piracy.

As mentioned, India also co-sponsored Resolution 1976, which was the first ever UNSC Resolution to tackle piracy. India was also active in raising the issue of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea at the UNSC. Indian representatives argued in a debate on the issue that “the failure of the international community to act decisively against piracy

off the Coast of Somalia could have spawned a new surge in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea" (PMUN 2011l). India's approach to norm setting on the issue of anti-piracy therefore came in the form of pushing for reform to the existing norms, whilst providing resources both financially and in naval forces to counter-piracy.

3.2.3 India Responsible?

India's overriding policy towards piracy is highly reflective of their approach to intervention in the international system. Alongside advocating reforms to the current system, India was active in promoting the need to improve the law and order capabilities of the states affected, particularly Somalia (PMUN 2011h). To this end they opposed direct intervention within Somalia, instead favouring an approach of providing the Government of Somalia with the capability to counter piracy, through financial and technical help. India also flexed its growing naval muscle with the provision of ships to the international effort, and technical cooperation with international operations. This showed the rise of India's hard power capabilities and its willingness to project it. However, this particular issue area was in India's immediate region, so it did not reflect the projection of power further a field.

India did therefore take on the role of a responsible power and pursue great power status, as well as its own interests in the area of anti-piracy.

3.3 Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping has traditional been an area of the UN body where India has played an active role and continued to do so whilst on the Council. Indian representative Puri

told reporters that “every country…naturally pursues its own favourite themes or priorities. We are going to deal with peacekeeping” (*Indian Express* 2011b). Peacekeeping is not written into the UN charter but has evolved over time as part of the UNSC’s mandate of ensuring international peace. The Council sets the mandates for the peacekeeping missions and votes for their continuation. These missions in theory require the permission of the state, or states’, in question, but there is a growing trend for a more interventionist role when the state is no longer functioning. India opposes this growing interventionism, in line with its longstanding views on national sovereignty. Whilst on the Council India called for reform to the creation of mandates, demanding that the UNSC undertake “in-depth consultations with troop and police contributing countries” as “part of the mandate generation process” (PMUN 2011i). Furthermore, India called for increased funding for peacekeeping missions, as their mandates become more complex (idem).

3.3.1 Burden sharing

India has been involved in peacekeeping since the 1950s, having contributed 160,000 soldiers to 43 different missions, the most of any state (PMUN 2011a). In 2014 India was the third largest troop contributing country supplying 7,860 peacekeepers to ten different missions (PMUN(a)). India has also excelled in providing training for peacekeepers, recently opening a peacekeeping training school. Furthermore, India has contributed military advisors and force leaders to numerous missions (PMUN(a)). In this regard India can be seen to be a prominent burden sharer with regards to upholding the international order through peacekeeping. India was very active in expressing this message during its stint on the UNSC in 2011-12, mentioning it on over 30 separate occasions whilst in the UNSC (MEA 2011a, MEA 2012). India has

staked part of its claim on a permanent seat based on this commitment to burden sharing in the form of troop contributions (P. Mukherjee 2005).

However, although India provides large numbers of troops to uphold this institution of the UNSC, it does not provide large amounts of financial support. India ranks in the second to last category in terms of funding for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) as a result of its GDP per capita (UNGA 2013). Thusly India contributed 0.11% of the UNDPKO's budget in 2012, up to 0.13% by 2013 (UNGA 2012). This is in comparison to the P5 who contributed in 2013 the following: USA - 28.38%, France 7.22%, UK 6.68%, China 6.64% and Russia 3.15% (UN n.d.). In terms of resource contribution therefore India does not burden share at anywhere near the levels of the current great powers, nor other aspirant powers[3]. Instead India burden shares in the form of contributing troops and training for peacekeeping missions. Who then should get a say on a peacekeeping mandate, those donating the troops to enforce it or those paying them to? India argues that as a troop provider it should have a greater say over the mandates created, but the P5 are unwilling to reform this practise.

3.3.2 Norm setting

India actively sought to reform the process of peacekeeping whilst on the Council. These reforms took three distinctive forms. Firstly, Indian representatives argued that troop-contributing countries should be consulted in the creation or extension of peacekeeping mandates. This would therefore include consulting India as one of the leading contributors of troops. Secondly, India called on the Council, particularly the P5, for greater funding for peacekeeping missions. Indian representatives cited the

[3] Japan 10.83% and Germany 7.14% .

fact that UN peacekeeping in the last two decades had cost roughly $50bn, which by comparison is less than the annual expense of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan, with similar number of troops involved (*The Hindustan Times* 2011a). Thirdly, India sought to prevent the Council from adding increasingly complex tasks to peacekeeping mandates. This attempted reform was actively aimed at the growing interventionist nature of UN peacekeeping missions. India is opposed to such interventions, instead favouring a pluralist approach to the international system and maintenance of order. India therefore actively attempted to set new norms in the field of peacekeeping whilst at the same time putting forward India's case for being an great power. In this area India was less focused on creating public goods and more focused on its own status and non-interventionist agenda.

3.3.3 India Responsible?

India did actively seek to be seen as a responsible power in the area of peacekeeping. By continuing to provide troops India actively participated in the maintenance of international peace. Moreover, they attempted to set new norms that would give greater power to troop contributing countries. These new norms cannot widely be viewed public goods, as they instead focus on India's individual status seeking. However, upholding the non-interventionist agenda may be regarded by those who agree with India's stance, mainly smaller powers, as a public good. India's attempt to be seen as a responsible power with regards to peacekeeping is therefore not as simple as with counter-terrorism and anti-piracy.

4. Reaction to Crises

As mentioned in Section Three, 2011-12 was marked by political uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa. These uprisings have been termed the 'Arab Spring' and proved to be an ongoing source of tension between the members of the P5, as well as among non-permanent members of the UNSC. Two of the uprisings were brought to the attention of the UNSC due to the high levels of violence involved and the potential impact it could have on the wider region. These were the revolution in Libya and the ongoing civil war in Syria. Both tested the Council and the issue of humanitarian intervention. This section will assess how India reacted to both crises and whether, unlike commentators assessments (R. Mukherjee and Malone 2013), status seeking behaviour was undertaken.

4.1 Libya

Following uprisings in both Tunisia and Egypt, Libyans rose up their leader Mummar Gaddafi, who subsequently ordered his troops to fire on protestors. The ensuing conflict became a matter of international importance and made its way to the UNSC. India had a longstanding relationship with the Libyan regime due to the NAM and G77 interactions. India therefore had closer ties, and more potential sway, with Libya than any of the western powers in the Council.

4.1.1 Indian Actions

The UNSC sought to take action against the Libyan regime in February 2011 passing Resolution 1970, imposing an arms embargo and referring the case to the

International Criminal Court (ICC). India supported this resolution due to the unanimous support of the entire UNSC (C.R. Mohan 2011a), but did express reservations about referral to the ICC of which India is not a member (PMUN 2011c). The reason stated for the vote in favour was that states "from Africa and the Middle East, believe that such a referral would have the effect of immediate cessation of violence (idem).

With violence continuing, and becoming increasing bloody, the western permanent members France and the UK brought forward Resolution 1973 in March 2011 to create a no-fly zone over Libya. The Resolution passed the Council but with Abstentions from Russia, China, Germany, Brazil and India (*UNSC* 2011). India's abstention was explained for a number of different reasons. Firstly, Indian representatives argued that before force could be used all "political efforts" must be followed first "to address the situation" (PMUN 2011f). Furthermore, Indian representatives argued against the "far-reaching measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with relatively little credible information on the situation on the ground in Libya" (idem). Thus India openly opposed the extension of the Charter into the realm of intervention in a sovereign state. Having abstained India did then stress their commitment to the end of conflict and for the "legitimate demands of the Libyan people" to be met (idem).

The Resolution passed and the no-fly zone was implemented by forces from the UK, France and the USA. Rather than merely prevent Libyan jets from flying the international force attacked regime ground targets, arguably bringing stalemate on the

ground into regime change. This overextension of the Resolution's mandate was to prove an issue with regard to the UNSC's actions on Syria.

4.2 Syria

The Arab Spring spread to Syria in March 2011 with protests across the country. The government of Bashar al-Assad cracked down on protestors using security services and armed forces. This escalation in violence descended Syria into a bitter and ongoing civil war.

As with Libya the UNSC became involved in the issue of Syria due to the threat that it could spill over into different states. The Council has attempted to pass numerous resolutions on the issue of Syria, the majority of which were penned by the western permanent members and vetoed by Russia and China. The result has been the failure to implement a UN mandated arms embargo, or referral of the Syrian conflict to the ICC, let alone military intervention.

India's relationship with Syria prior to the uprising was cordial as both were members of the G77 and NAM. These good relations were reflected in November 2010 with Assad giving Syria's support to India's permanent membership to the UNSC. Assad announced that "we agree with India, and all other peace-loving countries, on the importance of reforming the UN so that it becomes more democratic, representative and efficient" (*Indian Express* 2010). As with Libya, India therefore had a working relationship which could have been used in the attempt to broker political deals.

4.2.1 Indian Actions

India's role in decisions on Syria within the UNSC was a very mixed picture. In its two-year stint India voted in favour of, or abstained from, a number of Resolutions. India abstained in the initial attempt at a Resolution in October 2011, appearing to side with the Assad regime's version of events. Indian representative Puri argued that "states also have the obligation to protect their citizens from armed groups and militants" (PMUN 2011k) and that the resolution did not "place any responsibility on the opposition to abjure violence and engage with the Syrian authorities for redressal of their grievances through a peaceful political process" (idem). However, in February, and then in July, 2012 India voted in favour of Resolutions that went against the Assad regime. However, this change in view did not mark an overall change in policy. By looking at other key votes in different UN organs an even more mixed picture emerges. In May 2012 India voted against the Assad regime at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), only to abstain on a second vote at the beginning of July (Bagchi 2012.). Finally, following the July 2012 UNSC vote against the regime, India abstained from a similar UNGA Resolution (idem).

During this flurry of UN activity India sought to resolve the crisis in Syria alongside its fellow aspirant power allies Brazil and South Africa, through the medium of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) grouping. IBSA took the unprecedented step of sending a delegation to Damascus in an attempt to negotiate a cession of violence in August 2011 (Bagchi 2011). The delegation "called for an immediate end to all violence" and recommended "respect for human rights and international human rights law" (Ganguly 2011.). However, this delegation failed to bring a halt to violence and proved to be largely been in vain. This did mark a new form of norm setting on the

part of India though, leading a small group of developing nations in the attempt to tackle an international crisis.

This mixed picture on India's position over the crisis in Syria is the chief cause of the negative reception India received on its overall 2011-12 stint. This criticism came from politicians and journalists both home and abroad. Numerous explanations have been put forward to explain this indecision including: India's "commitment to secularism", India's "ties with the Gulf", and India's "distaste of externally induced solutions to internal crises" (Bagchi 2012).

4.3 India Responsible?

As discussed in Section 2.3, the question of whether India was responsible in reaction to crisis depends entirely on the audience India was appealing to. By opposing direct intervention in Libya, and to a certain extent in Syria, India continued its own long held policy of favouring non-intervention in sovereign states.

The result of this non-interventionist agenda has had different impacts on different audiences. Western governments, which led the calls for humanitarian intervention, expressed disappointment with India (C.R. Mohan 2011b). This was heightened by the abstentions over Syria (*The Economic Times* 2011). To these audiences India's calls to respect state sovereignty were regarded as highly irresponsible and neglectful to those in Libya and Syria under attack from the state (*New York Times* 2012).

However, this is only one side's view of intervention. In India there were calls to go further than 'regret' the no-fly zone, and to instead condemn it (*Indian Express*

2011c). India has long supported the international norm of non-intervention in states, and from Section Three it is clear that they attempt to continue this norm in all their actions. When reacting to these two crises India continued to follow this policy.

In following this policy was India responsible? Using the initial measure of whether their actions provided public goods the answer is unclear. With regards to material burden sharing India provided nothing in the way of military or financial assets for the no-fly zone over Libya. In terms of immaterial burden sharing India did attempt to provide leadership through the IBSA grouping to bring an end to the conflict in Syria, but this proved unsuccessful.

By using the abstention on a number of Resolutions India failed to come out in direct opposition to the decisions made, instead deciding not to vote at all. However, an abstention is more than merely sitting on the fence, as it does reflect a lack of support from a member. However, without the power of the veto the difference between an abstention and a vote against is minimal. By abstaining India sought to show that it was committed to ending violence in both crises but not through interventionist methods (PMUN 2011f). India's burden sharing was therefore negligible with regards to providing a public good, but as it did not support the intervention and did not have the power of the veto little more could be expected in this regard.

With regards to norm setting India was more active. The overarching norm that India attempted to set and uphold was that of non-intervention within a sovereign state. On every occasion India stated its opposition to external intervention and favoured instead a solution from within the country in question (PMUN 2011f). However, this

message was inconsistent when compared to India's voting record, particularly on Syria. By both voting in favour and abstaining on Resolutions, with similar ends, India failed to show an overall commitment to the norms it purported. India's attempt to set norms therefore came only in rhetoric and was not fully backed up by action.

Do these actions therefore fall into the category of acting as a responsible power? As outlined in Section 2.3 the present international order favours the pluralist approach put forward by Bull (1977), which favours non-intervention and the preservation of states sovereignty to ensure order in the international society. States respecting each other's rights of sovereignty is fundamental to ensuring the preservation of order and peace in the current system. In supporting non-intervention it can therefore be seen that India did act responsibly in upholding the present international system and international order, even though commentators have bemoaned this stance (*New York Times* 2012). These commentators are joined by some of the leading powers within this system, namely the USA, UK and France, which seek to change the present norms in the international system in favour of humanitarian intervention, in states that fail to protect their people. This attempt to reform the system is not always born of good intentions but is framed that way.

India is opposed to this new paradigm as a result of its own ongoing insurgencies, especially in Kashmir. India is not alone in opposing this solidarist view on intervention with Russia and China also in agreement, as seen by their vetoes in the UNSC. The pluralist perspective is also shared by the majority of minor states that make up the UNGA. In pursuing non-interventionist norms India is therefore acting in its own interest whilst at the same time attempting to champion this view. To gain a

permanent seat on the UNSC India needs the support of the UNGA to amend the UN Charter. This is a procedural need, but also the support of a large number of states will put pressure on the P5 to agree to any reforms to the Charter or face the loss of legitimacy of their current leadership. Therefore although many commentators have regarded India's non-interventionist stance as irresponsible and reflective of the country not being ready to take a permanent seat in international politics (C.R. Mohan 2011b), it is instead the most prudent path to pursue to this end.

India's perceived weakness in purporting non-interventionist norms came as a result of their indecisive position on Syria. If India is to succeed in its end goal of a permanent seat it will have to rectify this indecision and support long term non-interventionist policy. However, with the P5 is divided over this issue India may well struggle to convince the USA, UK and France to support their membership bid, if it gets this far.

5. Conclusions, Limitations and Wider Relevance

There are a number of conclusions that can be taken from this study. Firstly, unlike the pessimistic assessments of many commentators, who focused on the short term outcomes, there were a number of areas in which India acted as a universally accepted responsible power. India's efforts in the fields of counter-terrorism reinvigorated the Counter-Terror Committee, setting and reaffirming norms on how to counter cross-border terrorism. In anti-piracy India led efforts to reform the current international efforts in the Indian Ocean, leading to a reduction in pirate attacks. India also flexed its newly acquired naval muscle, providing large numbers of ships and escort missions for ships of all nations. In peacekeeping India continued its historical legacy of contributing troops, whilst attempting to reform the mandate process for mission by increasing the consultation of troop contributing nations. In each of these three areas India succeeded in upholding international order and providing public goods.

In each of these areas though there is scope for a India to contribute more. In particular India's financial burden sharing was extremely limited in comparison to the other great powers. India also struggled to project its power outside of its immediate South Asian region. These are areas that India will need to continue to work in, if it wishes to seek even greater status as a responsible power, upholding international order from external threats. However, there are many domestic constraints which need to be overcome for this to happen (C.R. Mohan 2011c). Primarily India is held back by the need to provide national public goods to its people, before it can divert resources to provide international public goods. India's democracy acts as a constraint on its ability to incur costs for the benefit of international standing (Dormandy 2007:

71). The impact of domestic constraints is an important aspect of India's status seeking behaviour, and an area of further study that would add to the findings presented by this study.

India's reaction to international crisis bore the brunt of pessimistic reports from both home and abroad for two main reasons. Firstly, India's commitment to non-intervention was dismissed as irresponsible by some. As outlined in this study, India's approach on intervention aligns with the current international system, where order is based on mutual respect of state sovereignty. In this regard India acted in its own national interest, but also in the interest of a wider audience of smaller states, who also oppose great power intervention. These smaller states ultimately hold India's ambition of a permanent seat on the UNSC in their hands. India's actions therefore may be regarded as irresponsible to a humanitarian audience, but to the key audience of member states of the UNGA India acted responsibly in upholding the present international order. This study takes a very specific perspective on the pluralist and solidarist debate based upon the wider audience of all member states. Given more time and space, this study would be enriched by a deeper investigation into multiple audiences' views on the role of intervention in the international system. However, the findings of this study do hold for the specific audience that has been investigated. The study could further be widened to investigate the role of intervention in status seeking across other multilateral bodies.

The second, and more accurate, criticism India faced came as a result of its indecisive actions and voting patterns over the crisis in Syria. Although India was in opposition to external opposition in both Libya and Syria, their actions in the multiple bodies of

the UN failed to show this commitment. India alternated between voting in favour of, and abstaining from, Resolutions on Syria. This indecisive action weakened India's position as a committed non-interventionist power. There has been speculation over the reasons for this mixed picture, which include Indian loyalties to Gulf States on the one hand and domestic politics on the other. What is clear is that India failed to give an overall commitment to its chief agenda of non-intervention.

For all the rhetoric India's stint on the Council was never likely to lead to an instantaneous permanent seat. However, India did further its claim of being a responsible great power by being active in countering threats to the international order, which to the majority of states includes non-interventionism. Thus India succeeded in pursuing status and recognition to a very specific audience, who agree with India's pluralist perception of international society. To those states that do not follow this perspective, India's actions proved weak and disappointing from the aspirant great power.

India's long term status seeking goals were therefore progressed in 2011-12, but the methods through which this will be continued are likely to evolve in the coming years. India will need to overcome internal constraints if it is to incur a greater burden in upholding order as a great power in the international system. Until then, India may forever be an aspiring great power.

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